The bill amends federal and District of Columbia jury statutes to permit courts to excuse any individual who is breastfeeding when summoned for jury duty, if the person requests excusal. For federal courts it inserts a new subsection into 28 U.S.C. 1866 allowing the court—or the clerk under court-supervised jury selection plans—to grant the excuse; the D.C. code receives a parallel change.
This is a narrow statutory change with clear operational consequences: it converts breastfeeding into an express basis for excusal (not merely a discretionary accommodation), removes uncertainty for breastfeeding jurors, and forces courts and jury administrators to adjust procedures and forms. The amendment leaves several implementation questions open — for example, it does not define breastfeeding, set time limits, or require documentation — which will shape how uniformly the exemption is applied.
At a Glance
What It Does
The bill adds a new, explicit exemption from federal jury service for individuals who are breastfeeding and adds a matching exclusion in the D.C. jury statute. It requires courts to excuse a breastfeeding juror upon request and allows clerks to grant the excuse if authorized under the court’s jury selection plan.
Who It Affects
Directly affected parties are individuals summoned for federal or D.C. jury duty who are currently breastfeeding, federal and D.C. court clerks and jury administrators, and trial litigants whose jury pools may shrink. Employers of breastfeeding employees and maternal-health advocates will also see downstream effects in workforce and public-health contexts.
Why It Matters
By codifying breastfeeding as a statutory basis for excusal, the bill reduces ambiguity that has led to inconsistent local practices and ad-hoc judicial decisions. That clarity supports breastfeeding continuity but also changes jury-pool management, potentially increasing excusal rates and prompting administrative updates to summons procedures and jury selection plans.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill makes a simple, focused change to federal and D.C. jury laws: if someone summoned for jury service is breastfeeding, the court must excuse them if they ask to be excused. For federal courts the change comes as a new subsection to 28 U.S.C. 1866; the language gives the court the authority to excuse the person and permits a court to authorize the clerk to do so under the court’s jury selection plan.
The D.C. statute is changed in the same spirit, adding an exclusion the Court may grant when the individual is breastfeeding.
Crucially, the text grants excusal “upon the individual’s request.” The bill does not add definition, documentation requirements, or a temporal limit (for example, tied to an infant’s age). It also does not create a temporary postponement regime or require courts to accommodate breastfeeding in-session; the statutory outcome is excusal from service rather than deferral or accommodation during trial.Operationally, the change will require courts to update summons language and internal guidance so clerks and jury managers can process excusal requests consistently.
Some courts will handle these requests directly; others will need to amend jury selection plans to delegate authority to clerks. Because the statute applies only to federal courts and the District of Columbia, states retain their existing rules unless they enact similar measures, which could produce a patchwork of different approaches across jurisdictions.The absence of a statutory definition or evidence standard means courts will set practice through forms, local rules, and training.
That creates opportunities for straightforward implementation — a simple checkbox on a summons or an intake question — but also leaves room for uneven application and disputes about eligibility in close cases.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill adds a new subsection (h) to 28 U.S.C. 1866 that requires federal courts to excuse a summoned individual who is breastfeeding upon that individual’s request.
A court may delegate excusal authority to the clerk under supervision if the court’s jury selection plan authorizes such delegation, making clerk-granted excusals possible without a judge’s on-the-record order.
Section 2(b) amends D.C. Official Code §11–1908(b) to add an explicit exclusion allowing the Court to exclude a breastfeeding person from jury service upon request.
The statute provides no definition of “breastfeeding,” sets no time limit (such as an infant-age cutoff), and does not require medical documentation or proof of lactation.
The bill creates an excusal (permanent removal from that summons) rather than mandating postponement, in-session accommodations, or substitution procedures for juries.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
Every bill we cover gets an analysis of its key sections.
Short title
Gives the bill the public name "Jury Duty Exemption for Breastfeeding Act of 2026." This is purely stylistic and has no substantive legal effect; readers should look to Section 2 for the operative changes to statutes.
Federal courts: new explicit excusal for breastfeeding
Amends 28 U.S.C. 1866 by inserting a cross-reference in subsection (c) and appending a new subsection (h). Subsection (h) requires that an individual who is breastfeeding and summoned for federal jury service be excused by the court upon request. The provision also permits a court, through its jury selection plan, to authorize the clerk to grant the excusal under the court’s supervision. Practically, this creates a statutory route for excusal that previously relied on judges’ discretion and local administrative practice.
Parallel change to D.C. jury-exclusion list
Modifies the District of Columbia statute governing jury exclusions to add breastfeeding as an express basis for exclusion by the Court upon request. The drafting adjusts the existing subsection punctuation to fold the new exclusion into the statutory list. The effect is the same as the federal change for D.C.-level jury administration: breastfeeding becomes an on-request ground for exclusion.
How courts will operationalize excusal requests
Because subsection (h) permits clerk delegation only when the jury selection plan authorizes it, trial courts that want administrative handling must revise their plans or issue guidance. Courts that do not amend plans will process requests through judges. The statute does not require particular forms or proof, so local procedures will determine whether excusals are managed via a checkbox on a summons, an online portal, in-person statements, or written requests.
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Explore Justice in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Individuals who are actively breastfeeding: they gain a clear statutory path to be released from a federal or D.C. jury summons without needing to persuade a judge case-by-case.
- Employers of breastfeeding employees: employers face fewer last-minute staffing disruptions when their staff can rely on a statutory excusal instead of emergency leave or workplace pumping arrangements.
- Maternal and pediatric health advocates: organizations promoting breastfeeding receive an explicit policy recognition that can reduce barriers to continued lactation post-partum.
- Court administrators seeking uniformity: jury managers gain a bright-line statutory basis to build standardized intake procedures and reduce ad-hoc judicial decisions.
Who Bears the Cost
- Federal and D.C. trial courts and clerk’s offices: they must update summons forms, jury selection plans, intake systems, and staff training to implement and record excusals.
- Litigants and trial counsel: potentially smaller or less representative jury pools could affect voir dire strategies and, in close cases, trial outcomes if excusal rates increase in certain demographic groups.
- Jury managers facing administrative workload: initial increases in excusal requests or clarification disputes will consume staff time and may require IT or process changes.
- Taxpayers/local governments operating federal or D.C. jury programs: minor implementation costs (printing, software updates, training) will fall on court budgets that are already resource-constrained.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The bill pits two legitimate public interests against each other: supporting breastfeeding and reducing barriers to lactation versus preserving citizens’ civic duty and the integrity of representative jury pools. The policy is straightforward to implement in principle, but granting excusals on request risks shrinking or skewing jury pools; limiting excusals with stricter proof or time windows would protect jury composition but would reintroduce barriers that the bill seeks to remove.
The bill is brief and leaves critical implementation questions unresolved. It does not define “breastfeeding” (no age limit for the nursing child, no distinction between direct nursing and expressed milk), nor does it require any documentation such as a physician’s note.
That makes the exemption administrable with minimal intrusion, but it also opens the door to inconsistent interpretations and potential gaming where courts lack clear intake procedures.
Because excusal is granted "upon the individual’s request" and the statute creates excusal rather than deferral, juries could lose potential panelists permanently for the duration of the summons. Courts will need to reconcile this with rules and practices designed to produce representative juries; high excusal concentrations in particular demographics could raise equity and representativeness concerns.
Finally, by applying only to federal courts and the District of Columbia, the bill creates a two-tier landscape across jurisdictions: state courts will continue under existing rules unless they enact parallel changes, producing uneven access to this form of relief nationwide.
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