The Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act would forbid using funds to procure batteries produced by a defined set of foreign entities starting October 1, 2027. It targets producers tied to major Chinese battery makers and other listed entities, with a broad definition of what counts as production by those entities.
The bill allows limited waivers for risk assessments, cost and availability considerations, or research purposes, subject to notification to Congress. It also requires a DHS-wide impact report within 180 days on how the prohibition would affect mission and costs.
At a Glance
What It Does
Starting Oct 1, 2027, none of the funds appropriated for DHS may be obligated to procure a battery produced by any entity listed in subsection (b). A battery is produced by such an entity if the entity assembles the final product or provides a majority of its components.
Who It Affects
DHS procurement offices (across CBP, ICE, Secret Service, TSA, Coast Guard, FEMA, FLETC, CISA and related entities) and battery suppliers (domestic and international) that would otherwise compete for DHS contracts.
Why It Matters
This creates a supply-chain security posture by limiting exposure to identified foreign producers and aligns DHS purchases with potential domestic alternatives, while preserving flexibility through waivers and requiring oversight reporting.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The bill targets DHS’s battery procurement by restricting funds from being used to buy batteries produced by a list of foreign entities, effective in 2027. The list includes prominent Chinese battery manufacturers and other entities tied to national security or regulatory concerns.
The law defines production in a way that a battery is treated as produced by a listed entity if that entity makes the final battery or supplies a majority of its components. It creates waivers for cases where there is no national security risk, no available domestically produced alternatives, or for research purposes, with a requirement to notify Congress within 15 days of any waiver.
Within 180 days of enactment, DHS must prepare a report detailing anticipated mission and cost impacts across major DHS components. The bill also references existing sanctions-related lists and DFAS-style regulatory mechanisms to determine which entities trigger the prohibition, and it permits future adjustments via the waiver process.
The overall aim is to reduce dependency on foreign adversarial battery producers and bolster domestic supply chain resilience for critical DHS operations, while maintaining guardrails against unnecessary disruption.
The Five Things You Need to Know
The bill bans DHS funds from procuring batteries produced by listed foreign entities starting Oct 1, 2027.
A battery is considered produced by a listed entity if the entity assembles the final product or supplies a majority of components.
Waivers can be granted for no national security risk, no cost/availability constraints, or research purposes, with 15-day Congressional notification.
The Act relies on existing lists (Uyghur Forced Labor Act lists, DoD Chinese military company designations, CFR supplements) to define production and eligibility.
DHS must deliver a 180-day impact report detailing mission and cost implications across major DHS components.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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General prohibition on DHS procurement of batteries from listed entities
Beginning October 1, 2027, no funds authorized or appropriated for the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated to procure batteries produced by any entity specified in subsection (b). This creates a hard exclusion from the DHS procurement pipeline for those listed producers, aligning procurement with the goal of reducing foreign-adversary exposure in critical energy storage.
Entities specified
The list includes CATL, BYD, Envision Energy, EVE Energy, Gotion High-tech, Hithium, any entity on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act lists, Chinese military companies identified under DoD authorities, and related CFR-listed entities or successors, plus subsidiaries. The section binds production to the entity’s control over final assembly or majority component supply, extending the prohibition to successors and corporate affiliates.
Treatment of production
For purposes of the prohibition, a battery is treated as produced by a listed entity if that entity assembles the final product or supplies a majority of its components. This prevents circumvention by minor contract manufacturing or downstream assembly arrangements and tightens the nexus between production and the listed entity.
Waivers
Waivers may be granted if (A) there is no national security, data, or infrastructure risk from the batteries; (B) there is no available alternative that is similar or better in cost and quality and not produced by a listed entity. A separate waiver allows for research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis. Not later than 15 days after a waiver, DHS must notify the relevant Congressional committees.
Report on impact
Within 180 days of enactment, DHS must submit a report detailing anticipated mission and cost impacts across major components, including CBP, ICE, Secret Service, TSA, Coast Guard, and other specified agencies. The report will guide ongoing policy refinement and resource planning.
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Explore Defense in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- DHS procurement teams seeking secure, non-listed-sourced batteries, enabling clearer vendor qualification and risk management.
- Domestic battery manufacturers not listed in subsection (b) who could compete for DHS contracts.
- U.S. critical-infrastructure operators and contractors pursuing reliable, domestically sourced energy storage solutions for DHS programs.
Who Bears the Cost
- DHS and component agencies may face higher upfront costs or longer lead times as they shift to non-listed suppliers.
- Domestic producers on the restricted list lose DHS demand, potentially impacting revenue and employment in those segments.
- Taxpayers may incur higher costs if domestically sourced substitutes are more expensive or less scalable in the near term, and there are administrative costs tied to waiver processes and reporting.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
Balancing DHS’s need for secure, readily available power supplies against the potential cost, lead-time, and supply constraints of domestically sourced or non-listed batteries; the bill’s reliance on waivers to preserve flexibility highlights the trade-off between security and operational readiness.
The bill introduces a constrained but robust safety mechanism for DHS procurement—waivers exist but require careful justification and congressional notification, which creates a built-in accountability loop. The reliance on a long, growing list of entities tied to Uyghur labor prohibitions and defense designations ensures that multiple regulatory regimes feed into the decision framework, but it also raises questions about the availability and cost of capable substitutes, potential supply gaps, and the readiness of domestic manufacturers to scale to DHS demand.
In practice, the rule could spur investment in U.S. battery production and domestic supply chains, but it may also create friction with agencies that have urgent operational needs or limited domestic options. The statute would benefit from explicit timelines for updating the entity list and clearer remedies if no viable substitutes exist beyond waivers.
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