This Bill amends multiple Commonwealth Acts governing the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade), the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), the Australian Safeguards Office and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel. It creates new supervisory tools—written performance standards, formal suspension powers, expanded termination grounds and stricter limits on outside paid work—and inserts a power for the Minister to give general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel.
Those changes reallocate governance authority toward the ministerial level and tighten behavioural and conflict-of-interest regimes for senior statutory officers. The practical effect is a suite of accountability mechanisms that will alter executive autonomy across trade, research, safeguards and law-drafting functions, with implications for independence, transparency, and the conduct of internal and anti-corruption inquiries.
At a Glance
What It Does
The Bill authorises the Minister to determine written performance standards for specified agency heads, to suspend appointments by written notice (initially up to 3 months, with limited extensions), and to expand termination grounds to include conduct amounting to 'serious misconduct' and unsatisfactory performance against the new standards. It also replaces narrow references to 'employment' with broader 'paid work' restrictions and allows the Minister to issue general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel.
Who It Affects
Directly affected are the CEO of Austrade, the CEO of ACIAR, the Director of the Australian Safeguards Office and the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel. Indirectly affected parties include agency boards, legal drafters, the Australian Public Service Commissioner, and bodies conducting corruption or conduct inquiries such as the National Anti‑Corruption Commission.
Why It Matters
The Bill replaces ambiguous supervisory practices with statutory mechanisms that accelerate ministerial intervention and formalise performance-based removal. For the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, the directional power and tightened tenure rules risk altering perceived drafting independence; for security- and trade-related agencies, the Bill creates quicker administrative levers to manage alleged misconduct or incapacity.
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What This Bill Actually Does
The Bill layers new, written performance standards onto the statutory framework for a set of senior Commonwealth offices. In each relevant Act the Minister is given express power to determine a performance standard in writing; the Bill explicitly states those standards are not legislative instruments, which limits parliamentary disallowance and formal regulatory scrutiny.
The Bill also introduces unsatisfactory performance measured against those standards as a standalone basis for termination.
Suspension is formalised across the agencies. The Minister can suspend an appointment by written notice and must specify the period.
Suspensions initially cannot exceed three months but the Bill permits extensions—capped at 12 months in narrowly defined circumstances—where an inquiry is under way or findings are pending; the text lists the kinds of inquiries that qualify, including APS Commission inquiries and National Anti‑Corruption Commission investigations. Remuneration and allowances continue during suspension, and for the Safeguards Director the Minister must publish notice of a suspension or extension.The Bill tightens the grounds and mechanics for removal.
Termination provisions are standardised to permit removal for misbehaviour, incapacity and conduct amounting to 'serious misconduct.' The legislation supplies concrete examples that render 'serious misconduct' operational: breaches of the APS Code of Conduct that the Minister deems serious enough to justify termination; unlawful discrimination; and findings or opinions in NACC‑style investigation reports that suggest corrupt conduct. The Bill also clarifies when misconduct is treated as having occurred for transitional purposes—often pegged to the date an investigation report or Commissioner determination is given.Outside work rules are broadened by defining 'paid work' to capture employment, self‑employment and other gainful activities; heads must obtain Ministerial approval before engaging in paid work outside their official duties.
For the Office of Parliamentary Counsel the Bill goes further: it reduces maximum term length from seven to five years for certain appointments, introduces absence thresholds that can trigger termination, and permits the Minister to issue general written directions to the Office (subject to carve-outs for certain functions under the Public Service Act and PGPA Act). Direction(s) must be complied with and may be published, but they are expressly not legislative instruments.
The Five Things You Need to Know
Suspension is time‑bound: an initial suspension period may not exceed 3 months but can be extended—up to 12 months—if specified inquiries are under way or their reports are being considered.
Performance standards set by the Minister are expressly declared not to be legislative instruments, limiting formal parliamentary oversight of their content.
The Bill defines 'serious misconduct' to include breaches of the APS Code of Conduct judged by the Minister to warrant termination, unlawful discrimination, serious or repeated bullying or harassment (for Parliamentary Counsel), and findings or opinions in National Anti‑Corruption Commission‑style reports indicating corrupt conduct.
Term lengths are shortened from 7 to 5 years for the ACIAR CEO and for Parliamentary Counsel appointments made after commencement; transitional rules apply to appointments made earlier.
The Minister may give general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel that the Office must comply with, although directions cannot override specific functions exercised by the First Parliamentary Counsel under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act.
Section-by-Section Breakdown
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Performance standards, suspension, termination and paid‑work limits for the Austrade CEO
The amendments add a statutory 'performance standard' determined in writing by the Minister and make unsatisfactory performance against that standard a ground for termination. They create a suspension power (written notice, specified period) with explicit extension paths tied to formal inquiries and preserve salary during suspension. The Bill replaces 'employment' with a broader 'paid work' definition and requires ministerial approval for outside paid work. Practically, this gives the Minister clear, repeatable levers to manage alleged misconduct or poor performance while leaving investigation thresholds and decision timing in ministerial hands.
Shortened tenure and matching oversight regime for the ACIAR CEO
The term of office for the ACIAR CEO is reduced from seven to five years for appointments made after commencement. The schedule mirrors Austrade’s accountability amendments: a written performance standard, suspension and extension rules, expanded termination grounds and 'paid work' controls. Translational clauses make many provisions apply to incumbents regardless of appointment date, but some triggers—such as when 'serious misconduct' is taken to occur—are tied to when investigation reports are provided to the Minister.
Suspension, termination and public notification for the Safeguards Director
The Director of Safeguards faces the same suspension architecture but with an added duty for the Minister to publish notice when a suspension or extension occurs. The Bill ties extension eligibility to specific inquiry types, including APS Commissioner inquiries under regulations and corruption investigations under the NACC Act, and standardises termination grounds. The public notice requirement is a procedural wrinkle that increases transparency for this security‑sensitive role but also makes suspensions visible in a high‑stakes domain.
Ministerial directions power for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel
The Bill inserts an express power for the Minister to give written directions of a general nature to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, requires compliance by the Office, and allows the Minister to publish directions. The provision contains carve‑outs: directions do not apply to the extent they relate to the First Parliamentary Counsel’s exercise of functions under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act. The clause expressly states that directions are not legislative instruments, reducing parliamentary oversight of their content and use.
Shortened terms, conduct standards, absence triggers and paid‑work restrictions for Parliamentary Counsel
The Bill shortens maximum appointment terms from seven to five years, introduces performance standards, and expands termination triggers to include absence thresholds (5 consecutive days or 10 days in 12 months) and failure to disclose interests under PGPA. It also broadens the paid‑work prohibition to explicitly catch practice as a barrister or solicitor and other self‑employment, making Minister approval necessary. Those mechanisms create new supervision points for the drafting office and an administrative path to discipline or removal that bypasses only criminal or severe incapacity pathways.
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Explore Government in Codify Search →Who Benefits and Who Bears the Cost
Every bill creates winners and losers. Here's who stands to gain and who bears the cost.
Who Benefits
- Ministers — gain clearer statutory levers (written performance standards, suspension and termination pathways, and directions over OPC) to manage senior officers and respond quickly to misconduct allegations or performance problems.
- Agency boards and senior executives — obtain formal powers to pause a leader’s duties during inquiries without having to negotiate interim arrangements, preserving operational continuity while investigations proceed.
- Integrity bodies and investigators (APS Commissioner, NACC) — receive clearer integration with agency governance: the Bill recognises and links their inquiries to suspension extensions and termination triggers, potentially accelerating administrative responses to their findings.
Who Bears the Cost
- Senior statutory officers (Austrade CEO, ACIAR CEO, Safeguards Director, Parliamentary Counsel) — face reduced tenure security, expanded definitions of removable misconduct and stricter limits on outside income and practice.
- Office of Parliamentary Counsel staff and the legal‑drafting community — risk a perceived or real erosion of drafting independence if ministerial directions alter drafting priorities or content, which may affect the quality and impartiality of law drafting.
- Agencies and central agencies — will incur administrative and legal costs to implement new suspension/termination procedures, publish notices, manage transitional questions and defend potential legal challenges to dismissals or direction compliance.
Key Issues
The Core Tension
The central dilemma is accountability versus institutional independence: the Bill equips ministers with clearer and faster tools to address misconduct and poor performance among senior agency officers, but those same tools—broad discretionary thresholds, non‑disallowable performance standards, suspension extensions and directions to the parliamentary drafting office—risk undermining the professional and operational independence that underpins impartial public administration and high‑quality law drafting.
The Bill trades clearer accountability for new uncertainties about independence and process. It makes performance standards central to removal for unsatisfactory performance but shields those standards from parliamentary disallowance by declaring them non‑legislative instruments.
That raises transparency questions: Ministers will set binding benchmarks that lack the procedural visibility and oversight of instruments subject to disallowance.
The 'minister is satisfied' formulation appears repeatedly as the decision point for escalation from breach to termination; the Bill provides no statutory test for that satisfaction. That gives the Minister broad, fact‑sensitive discretion and creates predictable grounds for judicial review claims alleging procedural unfairness or an absence of rational basis.
Suspension powers with extensions up to 12 months tethered to inquiry status create practical due‑process tensions: a long suspension preserves pay but removes functional authority for a protracted period, and the Bill limits the procedural protections available to the affected officer.
The directions power over the Office of Parliamentary Counsel is the most constitutionally and operationally sensitive change. The Bill attempts to safeguard certain functions by carving out functions under the Public Service Act and the PGPA Act, but it leaves ambiguous the boundary between general directions and independence in law drafting.
That ambiguity can chill internal advice, invite external scrutiny, and produce litigation over whether a particular direction illegally interferes with the legal duties of the First Parliamentary Counsel.
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